RISK - THERE IS NO BANK SUPERVISION  BECAUSE  
THE GOV'T IS BY THE 1% OF THE 1% AND FOR THE 1%

"I think you guys are breaking the law," Warren writes
- Dimon suddenly got quiet and responded, "So hit me with a fine. We can afford it."  
That's for sure. JP Morgan Chase was one of five of the world's largest banks hit with a total $5.7 billion fine after pleading guilty to global currency manipulation charges. Add to that, the $13 billion settlement it paid because of its funding of bad mortgages. Nonetheless, in the fourth quarter of 2014 alone, the company reaped in a $4.9 billion profit.

Who Watches the Watchers who Watch Over the Banks?

How during crisis, 9 financial firms with clean audits from the Big Four collapsed in months

2001 Seriously, Bernie Madoff was on the last SEC market-structure committee (scroll down to members)

Ernst  & Young Deloitte, PricewaterhouseCoopers and KPMG audit companies that account for 98 percent of the value of U.S. stock markets. During the crisis, nine major financial institutions collapsed or were rescued by the government within months of receiving clean bills of health from one of the Big Four. While Schnurr was deputy managing partner at Deloitte, the firm signed off on the books of Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual and Fannie Mae. Each went bust soon after, costing investors over $115 billion in losses.

Part 1 How Wall Street captured Washington’s effort and can't rein in banks
Part 2 U.S. banks moved billions of dollars in trades beyond Washington’s reach
Part 3 Accounting industry and SEC hobble America’s audit watchdog

LOOSEY GOOSEY
SEC FAILURES

THEY CAN STASH THE CASH IN OFFSHORE ACCOUNTS

US has refused to join the Common Reporting Standard (CRS)

USE HSBC AND THEIR SECRETS ARE PROTECTED

An internal government report obtained by The Hill says the Securities and Exchange Commission has failed to properly guard sensitive nonpublic information. [READ INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT.]  The report from the SEC’s Inspector General says the agency failed to clear the room during non-public executive session votes of the five-member board.  It also found that officials didn’t keep complete attendance records during at least one high-profile meeting involving a J.P. Morgan settlement worth $200 million.  The 16-page Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report didn’t blame an individual for leaking information, but it raised questions about how the agency conducts routine business. exposes nonpublic market-sensitive information to lawyers, staffers and the general counsel of SEC commissioners who aren’t authorized to see it.

FOLLOW TWITTER REPORTS ON BARCLAY

NO JUSTICE NO PEACE

Inside the New York Fed: Secret Recordings and a Culture Clash - The New York Fed had become too risk-averse and deferential to the banks it supervised. Its examiners feared contradicting bosses, who too often forced their findings into an institutional consensus that watered down much of what they did.

THE CHUTZBA - NO ONE HELD ACCOUNTABLE CAUSE 
NO ONE HAS TO COMPLY WITH THE FED'S CRITERIA!
THE FED DOESN'T PUNISH THE BANK!! - NO SUPERVISION AT ALL.

THIS !!! -- NO CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICY 

THE FED CULTURE OF FEAR - I DON'T KNOW WHAT I THINK -  UNTIL I KNOW WHAT MY BOSS THINKS!

BACKGROUND

HAVE A DISCUSSION - THEN DON'T ACT ON IT - THE MEETING = IT'S DONE. WHAT ACTION DO THEY TAKE? NONE. THEY DON'T OBLIGATE THE BANK TO DO ANYTHING ! 

Oct 11 2013 Whistleblower Suit Confirms that the New York Fed is in the Goldman Protection Racket By Yves Smith

A former bank examiner at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Carmen Segarra, filed a suit (embedded at the end of this post) against the New York Fed and several of its employees alleging, among other things, improper termination. The complaint is a doozy and some of the additional details supplied by Segarra to ProPublica make an already ugly picture look even worse.
 

Takeaways

• Former New York Fed examiner, Carmen Segarra, after uncovering problems with Goldman Sachs' conflict-of-interest policy says her supervisors pressured her to falsify her findings; that Goldman's policies were inadequate, and she refused.
• Segarra and New York Fed colleagues downgraded because of deficient policies.
• Segarra found that Goldman's efforts to wall off conflicts in a multi-billion dollar energy deal was full of holes.

9/26/14 Ex-regulator releases secret Goldman Sachs tapes in bid to win legal fight Former New York Fed employee Carmen Segarra claimed she was fired because her bosses thought she was too tough on Goldman Sachs.

9/26/14 A former US bank examiner who alleges she was fired for being too tough on Goldman Sachs has released hours of secretly recorded tapes to add muscle to her argument as she tries to win a legal appeal.  Carmen Segarra is a former New York Federal Reserve bank examiner who butted heads with her bosses over her policing of Goldman Sachs. Segarra alleges that her attempts to discipline Goldman Sachs were blocked by her bosses at the New York Fed, who she suggests were intent on giving Goldman Sachs no trouble. The Fed disputes her allegations, as does Goldman.  Segarra’s case raises a host of questions about “regulatory capture”, the term for regulators who become too cozy with the industry they are meant to police.

The Secret Recordings of Carmen Segarra SEP 26, 2014 An unprecedented look inside one of the most powerful, secretive institutions in the country. The NY Federal Reserve is supposed to monitor big banks. But when Carmen Segarra was hired, what she witnessed inside the Fed was so alarming that she got a tiny recorder and started secretly taping. In Print

So Who is Carmen Segarra? A Fed Whistleblower Q&A

In 2013  Segarra sued the New York Fed and her bosses, claiming she was retaliated against for refusing to back down from a negative finding about Goldman Sachs. A judge threw out the case this year without ruling on the merits, saying the facts didn't fit the statute under which she sued. 
Segarra had made a series of audio recordings while at the New York Fed. Worried about what she was witnessing, Segarra wanted a record in case events were disputed. So she had purchased a tiny recorder at the Spy Store and began capturing what took place at Goldman and with her bosses.  Segarra ultimately recorded about 46 hours of meetings and conversations with her colleagues. Many of these events document key moments leading to her firing. But against the backdrop of the Beim report, they also offer an intimate study of the New York Fed's culture at a pivotal moment in its effort to become a more forceful financial supervisor. Fed deliberations, confidential by regulation, rarely become public.

Segarra was an experienced attorney who had spent her entire career working in banking in the corporate counsel’s office of large financial firms, most recently as a senior counsel at Citi. In other words, she is not a naif or a theoretician. She was hired as part of an effort to increase bank examination functions to meet Dodd Frank requirements. But Segarra wound up on a collision course with the old guard at the New York Fed, which is particularly deeply tied into Goldman. For instance, the current president, William Dudley, had been Goldman’s chief economist) and has a bias to protect rather than regulate financial firms. The senior officer responsible for Goldman at the New York Fed was called a “relationship manager.” No, I am not making that up.

Segarra was tasked to assess whether Goldman’s conflicts of interest policies were adequate in three separate cases: Solyndra, the El Paso/Morgan Kindler acquisition, and a bank acquisition by Sandanter. What is stunning if you read the complaint, which we’ve embedded below, is how high-handed Goldman was in its responses to Segarra’s inquiries. It’s not hard to imagine that they viewed this as a pro forma exercise that given their cozy relationship with the New York Fed, would go nowhere. They didn’t just stonewall, they told egregious lies. That sort of cover-up usually winds up being worse than the crime, but not if you are in a privileged class like Goldman. When Segarra (and initially, the other members of her team) kept pressing Goldman for answers and making clear that what they were getting was problematic, Goldman then started giving credulity-straining responses.

As the exam moved forward, Segarra came under pressure from the Goldman relationship manager, Michael Silva, who was also senior to her at the bank (this is how you can tell the new regulatory push is all optics: the examiners are subordinate to the established “don’t ruffle the banks” incumbents). Silva, who had been chief of staff to Geithner before becoming “relationship manager” to Goldman, appears, unlike Segarra, not to have had real world financial services experience (he looks to have joined the New York Fed as a law clerk in 1992 and stayed with the bank).

Segarra was fired abruptly after refusing to change her recommendations and destroy supporting documents, which was in violation of regulatory policy (bank examiners are not “fire at will” employees; they need to be put on notice and given the opportunity to correct deficiencies in their performance before they can be dismissed).

I’ve read other wrongful termination suits and Segarra’s looks very strong. It’s going to be awfully hard for the New York Fed to talk its way out of this one.

What is particularly damning for the Fed and Goldman is Goldman’s intransigence during the examination process and the howlers the New York Fed staffers used to justify treating the bank with kid gloves. The complaint is short and readable, but for your convenience, I’ll extract some of the really juicy bits.

The bone of contention is that bank regulations required Goldman to have a firm-wide conflicts of interest program. The reason that it needs to be firm wide is that letting business units have influence or worse, control over compliance issues is putting the foxes in charge of the henhouse. JP Morgan had risk control for its CIO unit located in the CIO, not the bank, level. It should be no surprise that a fiasco like the London Whale was the result. Goldman blew off Segarra’s first document request. When asked about it (before Goldman realized someone at the Fed was actually taking the matter seriously), the bank said on separate occasions that it had no firm wide conflicts of interest program.
And when Goldman finally started producing documents, things got uglier...

Class warfare
2 tired Justice system
Rules for the 99%  
No rules for Banksters

NO COMPLIANCE POLICY THERE FOR NO LAW

"Why do you have to say there's no policy?" her boss said near the end of the grueling session.
 "Professionally," Segarra responded, "I cannot agree."  
The New York Fed disputes Segarra's claim that she was fired in retaliation.

Goldman did not think its Code of Conduct was a firm-wide conflicts-of-interest policy.

SR 08-08 The Fed requirement for firm-wide conflicts-of-interest policies and procedures

When we asked for a copy of their firm-wide conflicts-of-interest policy, Goldman did not submit its Code of Conduct to us for our consideration. Goldman was correct not to think so. SR 08-08 [the Fed requirement for firm-wide conflicts-of-interest policies and procedures] and its supporting and related documentation do provide guidance as to the content you would expect to see discussed in a policy.

Goldman's Code of Conduct does not satisfy the requirements and expectations of SR 08-08. Other banks agree with Goldman. At the time, some had adopted both a Code of Conduct, which these banks did not consider a policy, as well as separate conflicts-of-interest policies. My direct management and some of my peers did not think Goldman's Code of Conduct was a conflicts-of-interest policy. Policies in banks are actually pretty standardized documents, with clear titles and content directly related to the title/purpose of the document, written in a language meant to be understood by every employee at every level.

Segarra had thought her job was simple: Follow the evidence wherever it led. Now she was being told she had to "enfold" business-line specialists and "defuse" their objections.  "What does this have to do with bank examinations," Segarra wondered to herself, "or Goldman Sachs?"

One New York Fed employee, a supervisor, described his experience in terms of "regulatory capture," the phrase commonly used to describe a situation where banks co-opt regulators. Beim included the remark in a footnote. "Within three weeks on the job, I saw the capture set in," the manager stated.

Enter Michael Silva - embedded inside the banks, with an open mandate to do continuous examinations in their particular area of expertise, everything from credit risk to Segarra's specialty of legal and compliance. 

Both were reigned in by Tom Baxter, the New York Fed's general counsel, he didn't want the  "Fed to assert powers it doesn't have." Legal but shady deals were ok with Tom. In the meeting with Goldman, an executive said the "no objection" clause was for the firm's benefit and not meant to obligate Goldman to get approval. Rather than press the point, regulators moved on. By law, the banks are required to provide information if the New York Fed asks for it. Segarra pointed out that Goldman might not have done the anti-money laundering checks that Fed guidance outlines for deals like these. If so, the team might be able to do more than just send a letter, she said. The group ignored her. At the Fed, simply having a meeting was often seen as akin to action, she said in an interview. "It's like the information is discussed, and then it just ends up in like a vacuum, floating on air, not acted upon."
Segarra pointed advice about behaviors that would make her a better examiner at the New York Fed. But his suggestions, delivered in a well-meaning tone, tracked with the very cultural handicaps that Beim said needed to change.  Kim: "I would ask you to think about a little bit more, in terms of, first of all, the choice of words and not being so conclusory."  Beim report: "Because so many seem to fear contradicting their bosses, senior managers must now repeatedly tell subordinates they have a duty to speak up even if that contradicts their bosses."

By the spring of 2012, Segarra believed her bosses agreed with her conclusion that Goldman did not have a policy sufficient to meet Fed guidance. The Fed's official guidance,  calls for a policy that encompasses the entire bank and provides a framework for "assessing, controlling, measuring, monitoring and reporting" conflicts. Segarra asks Gwen Libstag, the executive at Goldman who is responsible for managing conflicts, whether the bank has "a definition of a conflict of interest, what that is and what that means?"  "No," Libstag replied at the meeting in April. 
Segarra is in Silva's small office at Goldman Sachs with his deputy. The two are trying to persuade her to change her view about Goldman's conflicts policy.  "You have to come off the view that Goldman doesn't have any kind of conflict-of- interest policy," are the first words Silva says to her. Fed officials didn't believe her conclusion — that Goldman lacked a policy — was "credible."

"The Divide: American Injustice in the Age of the Wealth Gap,"
Taibbi explores how the Depression-level income gap between the wealthy and the poor is mirrored by a "justice" gap in who is targeted for prosecution and imprisonment. "It is much more grotesque to consider the non-enforcement of white-collar criminals when you do consider how incredibly aggressive law enforcement is with regard to everybody else," Taibbi says. video

Corporate Governance

Governance Risk and Ethics 
A good way to remember the key concepts of corporate governance is to thinkof the mnemonic HAIRDRIFT .

7/21/14 Financial Literacy and the Audit Committee 

The Audit Committee is widely recognized as an important mechanism required to ensure good corporate governance.Section 359 (3) & (4) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2004 provides that every public company shall have an Audit Committee and the Committee shall consist of an equal number of Directors and representatives of the shareholders of the company (subject to a maximum number of six members). The Committee “shall examine the External Auditor’s report on the Financial Statements and make recommendations thereon to the annual general meeting as it may think fit”.

The definition of financial literacy is vague as Article 30.2 of the SEC Code simply states that members of the Committee should have basic financial literacy and should be able to read financial statements. It is unclear whether the ability to read and understand financial statements suffices as financial literacy or whether some additional expertise in this area is required. The Canadian Securities Administrators’ National Instrument 52-110 states that it is not necessary for a member of the Audit Committee to have a comprehensive knowledge of accounting and auditing standards to be considered financially literate.   Given the responsibilities imposed on the Committee by CAMA and the SEC Code, it is clear that Audit Committee Members need to be able to read and understand financial statements, including the company’s balance sheet, income statement and cash flow statement.   Each member is not expected to be an expert in accounting or finance because the Audit Committee is at liberty to seek independent expert advice as required. It is however important that committee members are able to ask the right questions, evaluate and interpret responses. To ensure the effectiveness of the Committee, it is expected that at least one member of the Committee should possess appropriate knowledge and experience to review the financial reporting process. This has become more important given the adoption of the International Financial Reporting standards (IFRS).

 

Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Financial World
2014 THE RECIPE: READ How To Rob A Bank: William Black at TEDxUMKC

Fraud Prosecution Stopped the S&L Crisis … But Government REFUSES to Prosecute Fraud Now
30,000 Criminal Referrals Led to 1,000+ Felony Convictions In Major Fraud Cases During the S&L Crisis … Not Even a SINGLE Prosecution Today, Even Though the 2008 Crisis Was 70 Times Bigger

• Currently the same agency – Office of Thrift Supervision – which was supposed to regulate many of the largest makers of liar’s loans in the country has made … zero criminal referrals.
• The Office of Comptroller of the Currency – which is supposed to regulate the largest national banks has made zero criminal referrals.
• The Fed appears to have made zero criminal referrals.
• The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is smart enough to refuse to answer the question.

THEY KNOW
HOW TO
COOK THE BOOKS
BABY!

BrokerCheck 

FINRA phone 301-590-6500
File a Complaint http://www.finra.org/investors/investor-complaint-center

Launches Online BrokerCheck Research Tool, But Does It Work?

Call the BrokerCheck Hotline at (800) 289-9999. Monday-Friday 8 a.m. – 8 p.m. ET email BrokerCheck@finra.org

Federal and state securities laws generally require that any person or firm selling securities to the public, or advising members of the public as to investment decisions, must be licensed, registered and in good standing with the appropriate regulatory agencies. In the past there really was not an easy way to verify whether a person or firm was adequately licensed. To the extent you could even get this information (or even figure out where to get it), it would typically require reviewing multiple federal or state online databases and/or talking to one or more representatives. Most investors don’t even realize they should verify the credentials of a broker before handing over their investment dollars and you can see the impetus for creating and promoting the BrokerCheck database. The majority of critics take issue with the completeness of information provided on the site. Per statements from multiple industry professionals, missing information includes: certain records that brokers have successfully had expunged, information on brokers’ previous bankruptcy filings, and internal firm investigations.[see http://investor.gov/ for more ]

BofA's legal costs mount in Countrywide mortgage fiasco
Prosecutors want BofA to pay $864 million over a program called 'The Hustle.'
The bank already has shouldered about $50 billion in losses, settlements and other costs related to its Countrywide purchase. Federal prosecutors want BofA to pay $864 million after the bank's stinging defeat in a major civil fraud trial in October. A jury found BofA liable in a case centered on a Countrywide program called "The Hustle," which churned out risky home loans before selling them to mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  But whatever penalty the bank might pay, it will amount to a mere drop in the bucket of BofA's legal bills — much of it stemming from its ill-fated acquisition of the former Calabasas mortgage lender in 2008.  "It's chump change," said Dick Bove, bank analyst at Rafferty Capital Markets.  The bank already has shouldered about $50 billion in loan and foreclosure losses, lawsuit settlements and investigations and legal defense costs stemming from its purchase of Countrywide, just as the housing market cratered.

The Forecloser Jon Stewart

Glass-Steagall Act:

is most often used to refer to four provisions of the Banking Act of 1933 that limited commercial bank securities activities and affiliations between commercial banks and securities firms. For 60 years, a 37-page document kept the financial system relatively safe. It was repealed in 1999 which caused the tech bubble and the greatest financial crisis since the stock-market crash of 1929.

Dodd-Frank Act:

​From the moment Dodd-Frank passed, the banks’ financial results have tended to slide downward, in significant part because of measures taken in anticipation of its future effect. Many acknowledge that the bubble­-bust-bubble seesaw of the past decades isn’t the natural order of capitalism—and that the compensation arrangements just may have been a bit out of whack. “There’s no other industry where you could get paid so much for doing so little,” a former Lehman trader said. Paul Volcker, whose eponymous rule is at the core of the changes, echoes an idea that more bankers than you’d think would agree with. "Finance became a self-justification." "They made a lot of money trading with each other with doubtful public benefit."
A few years ago, the Masters of the Universe never could have imagined their industry being compared to big-box retailing. And yet, the model that had fueled bank profits has finally broken, as markets sputtered and new regulation kicked in. "Compensation is never really going to come back," a Wall Street headhunter told me. "That is something entirely new."
http://nymag.com/print/?/news/features/wall-street-2012-2/

FEDERAL RESERVE

CNBC: Federal Reserve Plan to Monetize the Debt/Stimulus = Ponzi Scheme

2010 - 9 TRILLION Dollars Missing from Federal Reserve, Fed Inspector General Can't Explain
Rep. Alan Grayson asks the Federal Reserve Inspector General about the trillions of dollars lent or spent by the Federal Reserve and where it went, and the trillions of off balance sheet obligations. Inspector General Elizabeth Coleman responds that the IG does not know and is not tracking where this money is. Article

Madoff Trustee Fights JPMorgan Bid To Move $6B Suit 
The trustee liquidating Bernard L. Madoff's investment company fought back Wednesday against JPMorgan Chase & Co.'s efforts to "escape the scrutiny" of a New York bankruptcy court by removing the trustee's $6.4 billion lawsuit against it to a district court.

Madoff, Lehman Trustees' Fees Could Bankrupt SIPC
Massive payouts to Securities Investor Protection Corp. trustees managing the bankruptcies of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.'s brokerage arm and Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC are threatening to bankrupt the group's $2.5 billion funding pool, a report released Wednesday said.

FDIC's Tab For Failed U.S. Banks Nears $9 Billion
The biggest stream of reimbursements, $1.21 billion in all, has gone to BankUnited Inc., of Miami Lakes, Fla. Its private-equity owners resurrected a similarly named savings institution that collapsed in 2009 under the weight of home loans made before the housing bust. The FDIC is on the hook to cover as much as 95% of losses on some loans at BankUnited, which went public in January. BankUnited has received $1.21 billion from the FDIC.

Approximately $6.6 billion in cash was likely stolen after being flown to Iraq during the months that followed the U.S. led invasion, Pentagon officials said recently.
Stuart Bowen, the U.S. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, told The Los Angeles Times that the sum just might be "the largest theft of funds in national history." The funds -- which were separate from a $53 billion appropriation Congress approved for Iraqi reconstruction efforts -- were cobbled together by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York before being flown to Baghdad and distributed to interim Iraqi ministers, who U.S. officials see as the most likely culprits in the theft: an allegation that's not officially been leveled. Under President George W. Bush the cash was part of a series of shipments totaling more than $12 billion, taken largely from the U.N. "oil-for-food" program and the sales of Iraqi oil. The Pentagon admitted last year that it could not account for over $8.7 billion in Iraqi reconstruction funds, and that about $2.6 billion of it was sent out without any documentation at all. Investigators said in 2005 that Bush officials apparently neglected to put procedures in place to track the money or hold recipients accountable for its proper applications.

Democrats, Republicans and the media were all complicit in helping the super rich recklessly dominate the economy while giving them massive handouts.

​Access Journalism Dominates The Business Media.

They are too cozy with the powerful on Wall Street to do their jobs correctly.

The media fawned over Wall Street stars such as Jamie Dimon at J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. (US:JPM);

Eliot Spitzer, former New York governor and attorney general, and Jimmy Cayne of Bear Stearns.

Why? They are part of the club.

FEDERAL RESERVE ACTIONS

The Federal Open Market Committee has authorized an extension of the existing temporary U.S. dollar liquidity swap arrangements with the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, and the Swiss National Bank through February 1, 2013.

The rate on these swap arrangements has been reduced from the U.S. dollar OIS rate plus 100 basis points to the OIS rate plus 50 basis points. In addition, as a contingency measure, the Federal Open Market Committee has agreed to establish similar temporary swap arrangements with these five central banks to provide liquidity in any of their currencies if necessary. Further details on the revised arrangements will be available shortly.
U.S. financial institutions currently do not face difficulty obtaining liquidity in short-term funding markets. However, were conditions to deteriorate, the Federal Reserve has a range of tools available to provide an effective liquidity backstop for such institutions and is prepared to use these tools as needed to support financial stability and to promote the extension of credit to U.S. households and businesses.
Information on Related Actions Being Taken by Other Central Banks: Bank of Canada | Bank of England | Bank of Japan (PDF) | European Central Bank | Swiss National Bank (PDF) 202-452-2955.

The Banker Nov 11, 2010  

Performed By Mike Daviot
Written, Directed and Produced By: Craig-James Moncur

LIBOR

UK orders WSJ to censor names from website, to no avail of course

That's when British prosecutors stepped in, obtaining a court order
"prohibiting the newspaper from publishing names of individuals not yet made public in the government's ongoing investigation," the Journal's Cassell Bryan-Low reported. From the paper's explanation:

The Journal received word of the order from the SFO by email at 7:18 p.m. London time. The news organization already had published on Dow Jones Newswires and the Journal's website, WSJ.com, an article by Mr. Enrich and reporter Jenny Strasburg that divulged names of traders and brokers that British prosecutors expect to publicly name next week. The article was taken down from the website but appears in Friday's print editions of the Journal circulated in the U.S. and in Asia.

Hey, if you're in the UK, don't read this paragraph. Your government still hasn't figured out the Internet. Her Majesty orders you not to read these names! 

"Among those who could be named are several of Hayes' former coworkers at both Citigroup Inc (NYSE:C) and UBS AG (NYSE:UBS). Michael Pieri, who was Hayes' boss while he worked at UBS, was fired by the bank and moved to Australia. Hayes' former assistant at UBS, Mirhat Alykulov, could also be on the list. Sources said he has been cooperating with investigators from the U.S. Another name which could be on the SFO's list is Christopher Cecere, who was Hayes' boss while he worked in Citigroup's Tokyo operations. Cecere resigned from his position at Citigroup around the same time Hayes was fired. Other people who could be on the list are ex HSBC Holdings plc (NYSE:HBC) (LON:HSBA) trader Luke Madden, former JPMorgan Chase & Co. (NYSE:JPM) employee Paul Glands, and former Rabobank employee Paul Robson." - via "ValueWalk"
http://www.valuewalk.com/2013/10/libor-scandal/

Email Exchange Contradicts Libor Testimony From Former UBS Head

http://www.valuewalk.com/2013/09/email-exchange-libor-testimony-from-former-ubs-head/
Alex Wilmot-Sitwell, former co-head of UBS AG and a current Bank of America Corp (NYSE:BAC) executive, testified that he didn’t recall UBS trader Tom Hayes and wasn’t sure if they had even been at the company at the same time, but British investigators have uncovered an email chain that shows Wilmot-Sitwell was involved in trying to retain Hayes, reports David Enrich
Those UBS Emails about Tom Hayes

UBS Executive email

The email (reprinted below; WSJ opted to withhold some executives’ names) calls all of Wilmot-Sitwell’s testimony into question because it demonstrates that he may be willing to lie to cover his actions. No doubt he will say that he had forgotten about the email exchange, or that it was a detail beneath his notice, but it still raises doubts about his veracity.

ex Citigroup Inc (NYSE:C) and UBS AG (NYSE:UBS) trader Tom Hayes
The WSJ also reports that ex Citigroup Inc (NYSE:C) and UBS AG (NYSE:UBS) trader Tom Hayes is expected to enter a plea of not guilty. He faces eight counts of charge in connection with allegedly fixing Libor. Two brokers, James Gilmour and Terry Farr, who formerly worked at R.P. Martin Holdings Ltd. who face similar charges are also expected to enter their pleas. However, it is not known how they plan to plea. 

Possible Names on the list
Michael Pieri, who was Hayes’ boss while he worked at UBS, was fired by the bank and moved to Australia. Hayes’ former assistant at UBS, Mirhat Alykulov, could also be on the list. Sources said he has been cooperating with investigators from the U.S.

Another name which could be on the SFO’s list is Christopher Cecere, who was Hayes’ boss while he worked in Citigroup’s Tokyo operations. Cecere resigned from his position at Citigroup around the same time Hayes was fired. Other people who could be on the list are ex HSBC Holdings plc (NYSE:HBC) (LON:HSBA) trader Luke Madden, former JPMorgan Chase & Co. (NYSE:JPM) employee Paul Glands, and former Rabobank employee Paul Robson.

—–Original Message——
From: UBS Executive 1
Sent: 10 Jul 2009 09:37
To: UBS Executive 2
To: Kengeter, Carsten
Cc: Alex Wilmot-Sitwell
Cc: UBS Executive 3
Subject: RE: Next week

Carsten,

Spoke to him as well and everything looks fine for now, tks all of you for ur help

—–Original Message——
From: UBS Executive 2
Sent: Friday, July 10, 2009 7:26 AM
To: Kengeter, Carsten
Cc: Wilmot-Sitwell, Alexander; UBS Executive 1; UBS Executive 2; UBS Executive 3
Subject: RE: Next week

Carsten,

I spoke with Tom as well and emphasized and endorsed.
His reaction was positive.

Best regards,
UBS Executive 2

—–Original Message——
From: UBS Executive 3
Sent: Friday, July 10, 2009 2:12 PM
To: Kengeter, Carsten
Cc: Wilmot-Sitwell, Alexander; UBS Executive 2; UBS Executive 1
Subject: Next week

Carsten,

I spoke to Tom just now and reiterated the messages you conveyed to him. Overall, he was receptive. I am sure he will become more comfortable as we all speak with one voice and show him some attention.

Regards,

UBS Executive 3

—–Original Message——
From: Kengeter, Carsten
Sent: Friday, July 10, 2009 10:53 PM
To: Wilmot-Sitwell, Alexander; UBS Executive 3; UBS Executive 2; UBS Executive 1
​Subject: Next week

I would like you call Tom Hayes in Tokyo please and reiterate my words of comfort to him. He will stay and not go to Citi.

We will speak directly on the phone and I will explain exactly what I told him.

Thanks.

Oct. 18, 2013 Journal Ordered Not to Divulge Libor Names U.K. Prosecutors Win Injunction Amid Investigation
article

LONDON—British prosecutors on Thursday obtained a court order prohibiting The Wall Street Journal from publishing names of individuals the government planned to implicate in a criminal-fraud case alleging a scheme to manipulate benchmark interest rates.A British judge ordered the Journal and David Enrich, the newspaper's European banking editor, to comply with a request by the U.K.'s Serious Fraud Office prohibiting the newspaper from publishing names of individuals not yet made public in the government's ongoing investigation into alleged manipulation of the London interbank offered rate, or Libor. The order, which applies to publication in England and Wales, also demanded that the Journal remove "any existing Internet publication" divulging the details. It threatened Mr. Enrich and "any third party" with penalties including a fine, imprisonment and asset seizure.
Injunction

The Journal received word of the order from the SFO by email at 7:18 p.m. London time. The news organization already had published on Dow Jones Newswires and the Journal's website, WSJ.com, an article by Mr. Enrich and reporter Jenny Strasburg that divulged names of traders and brokers that British prosecutors expect to publicly name next week. The article was taken down from the website but appears in Friday's print editions of the Journal circulated in the U.S. and in Asia. The article said the government was preparing to name roughly two dozen traders and brokers, adding that prosecutors were still finalizing their plans and that the list could change, citing people familiar with the process. Inclusion on the list doesn't represent a formal accusation of wrongdoing and doesn't mean the individuals will be charged with crimes. "This injunction is a serious affront to press freedom," said Dow Jones & Co., publisher of the Journal. "We have been left with no choice but to remove the previously published story from WSJ.com and to withhold publication from the print edition of The Wall Street Journal Europe. However, we will continue to vigorously fight the injunction in the coming days."

Under U.K. law—which seeks to balance freedom of the press with personal privacy and the integrity of the judicial process—it isn't unusual for the courts to impose reporting restrictions on the media to prevent them from reporting details that prosecutors believe could jeopardize an investigation or case. Even celebrities can obtain court orders to prevent the reporting about embarrassing revelations about their personal lives. In some instances, the orders are granted in an anonymous form so the media can't reveal the identity of the people who obtained them. The situation in Britain marks a contrast to the U.S. In the U.S., court orders preventing media from reporting something are exceedingly rare, and typically would be considered only in exceptional circumstances involving, for example, threats to national security. Some other European countries have even stronger privacy protection laws than the U.K. A spokeswoman for the Serious Fraud Office declined to comment on the court order. 

OCCUPY THE BANKS

OCCUPY THE BANKS

REMEMBER IT IS NOT A CONSPIRACY WHEN YOU CAN PROVE STRATEGY

THE MEMO

Lobbying firm Clark Lytle Geduldig & Cranford letter addressed to one of CLGC’s clients, the American Bankers Association.

CLGC’s memo proposes that the ABA pay CLGC $850,000 to conduct “opposition research” on Occupy Wall Street in order to construct “negative narratives” about the protests and allied politicians.

The memo also asserts that Democratic victories in 2012 would be detrimental for Wall Street and targets specific races in which it says Wall Street would benefit by electing Republicans instead. 

 

2013 Homeowners who are 90+ days late on their mortgages will now be automatically eligible for a mortgage modification. 

The program is only available to loans owned or guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie, which have been government-backed and controlled since late 2008. The relief would come in the form of a reduced interest rate, extended timeline for payments, or other measures.

 

2012 Instead of Bank of America foreclosing on some Florida homeowner, the homeowners had sheriff's deputies foreclose on Collier County, Bank of America. 

Todd Allen Helps homeowner foreclosing on a bank

It started five months ago when Bank of America filed foreclosure papers on the home of a couple, who didn't owe a dime on their home. The couple said they paid cash for the house. The case went to court and the homeowners were able to prove they didn't owe Bank of America anything on the house. In fact, it was proven that the couple never even had a mortgage bill to pay. A Collier County Judge agreed and after the hearing, Bank of America was ordered, by the court to pay the legal fees of the homeowners, Maurenn Nyergers and her husband.  The Judge said the bank wrongfully tried to foreclose on the Nyergers' house. After more than 5 months of the judge's ruling, the bank still hadn't paid the legal fees, and the homeowner's attorney did exactly what the bank tried to do to the homeowners. He seized the bank's assets. "They've ignored our calls, ignored our letters, legally this is the next step to get my clients compensated, " attorney Todd Allen told CBS.

Sheriff's deputies, movers, and the Nyergers' attorney went to the bank and foreclosed on it. The attorney gave instructions to remove desks, computers, copiers, filing cabinets and any cash in the teller's drawers. After about an hour of being locked out of the bank, the bank manager handed the attorney a check for the legal fees. "As a foreclosure defense attorney, this is sweet justice" says Allen.  Allen says this is something that he sees often in court, banks making errors because they didn't investigate the foreclosure and it becomes a lengthy and expensive battle for the homeowner.

 

7/9/14 SEC’s High-Speed Trader Plan Embraced by Exchange Leaders​